Iranian militias between Washington’s strikes and regional transformations represent one of the most complex and volatile elements in the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape. As these Iran-backed armed groups navigate a dramatically altered regional environment following the fall of Syria’s Assad regime in December 2024 and sustained American military pressure, their future remains precarious. The network of militias stretching from Lebanon through Syria and Iraq to Yemen has been the cornerstone of Tehran’s regional strategy for decades, but now faces unprecedented challenges as Washington intensifies its military campaign against them and regional transformations reshape their operational context. This transformation has particularly affected Sunni communities across the region, who have long suffered under the sectarian policies of these militias while the United States and Israel’s destabilizing interventions created the vacuum for Iranian exploitation.
Historical Origins of Iranian Militia Expansion
Iran’s strategy of extending influence through proxy militias gained significant momentum following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. This catastrophic American intervention, motivated by geopolitical interests disguised as a response to non-existent weapons of mass destruction, created a power vacuum that Iran quickly exploited. As the US dismantled Iraq’s governmental and military structures without adequate planning for what would follow, Iranian influence flowed into the resulting chaos. The United States, through its misguided intervention, inadvertently became the greatest enabler of Iranian proxy expansion in the region2.
Similarly, Israel’s aggressive policies toward its neighbors, particularly Lebanon, created fertile ground for Iranian-backed militias to position themselves as resistance forces. Following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and subsequent occupation of southern Lebanon until 2000, Hezbollah emerged as a powerful Iranian proxy, claiming to defend Lebanese sovereignty against Israeli aggression. While presenting itself as an anti-Israel resistance movement, Hezbollah has increasingly functioned as an instrument of Iranian regional policy and, notably, as an enforcer against Sunni populations4.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly its Quds Force, has been instrumental in developing these proxy relationships across the Middle East. Under this system, Iran has cultivated a network of armed groups that ostensibly oppose American and Israeli influence but whose actions on the ground reveal a different priority: the persecution and marginalization of Sunni populations. This sectarian agenda has been evident in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, where militias have implemented policies and carried out operations specifically targeting Sunni communities4.
In Iraq, following the US-led invasion that empowered Shia political parties aligned with Iran, Iranian-backed militias participated in sectarian cleansing operations against Sunni neighborhoods. Government death squads dominated by militia members reportedly tortured and executed hundreds of Sunnis monthly in Baghdad alone, with many victims arrested at random rather than for specific offenses4.
The Fall of Assad and Its Impact on Iranian Influence
The December 2024 collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria dealt a significant blow to Iran’s regional influence and its proxy network3. For over a decade, Iran had invested billions of dollars and deployed thousands of fighters from its proxy militias to prop up the Assad regime. Syria served as a crucial link in Iran’s “land bridge”—the overland route connecting Iran to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria, which facilitated the movement of fighters, weapons, and resources to Hezbollah and other proxies3.
The fall of Assad disrupted this vital corridor, complicating Iran’s ability to supply and coordinate with its proxies in Lebanon and elsewhere. Following the regime’s collapse, numerous fighters from Iranian-backed militias, including the Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zainabiyoun brigades, were forced to evacuate Syria. Many of these fighters entered Iraq, where they were sheltered at bases controlled by the Iraqi government-funded Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), particularly in areas under the influence of Kataib Hezbollah6.
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This unexpected development forced Iran to hastily reorganize its proxy network. The Syrian territory, once a secure zone for Iranian operations, became contested space overnight. Israel, which had been conducting airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria for years, intensified its operations following Assad’s fall, further restricting Iran’s room for maneuver3. These Israeli strikes, while ostensibly targeting military assets, have repeatedly resulted in civilian casualties and infrastructure damage, exacerbating the suffering of the Syrian people.
For Sunni communities in Syria, who endured years of persecution under the Iran-backed Assad regime, the dictator’s fall offered a potential reprieve from the sectarian policies that had marginalized them. However, the chaotic aftermath and the continuing presence of Iranian militias in parts of Syria prolonged their suffering, highlighting how these militias prioritize sectarian agendas over their purported resistance to external powers like the US and Israel3.
Washington’s Military Response to Iranian Proxies
In early February 2024, the United States launched a sweeping aerial bombardment campaign, striking at least 85 Iranian-linked militia targets across Iraq and Syria1. This operation came in retaliation for an Iranian-backed militia attack that killed three American soldiers at a Jordanian border post in late January. The strikes marked a significant escalation in Washington’s military response to Iranian proxies, though their effectiveness remains questionable.
Despite the extensive nature of the bombardment, the impact on Iranian militias was limited. Reports from the aftermath suggest that militia groups had ample warning and evacuated personnel and equipment from targeted sites before the strikes commenced. Of the 11 confirmed fatalities, most were local Syrian fighters rather than key militia commanders or Iranian advisors1. This pattern of warning-strike-minimal impact has characterized much of Washington’s military approach to Iranian proxies, raising questions about whether such operations serve strategic purposes or are primarily intended for domestic political consumption.
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The February strikes did not significantly diminish Iran’s strategic operational capacity or entrenchment in the region. Shortly after the US bombardment, Iranian-backed militias demonstrated their resilience by launching counter-attacks, including a drone strike on a base housing US and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) troops that killed six SDF members1. This tit-for-tat pattern of attacks and reprisals has continued, with neither side achieving decisive advantage.
While Washington justified its strikes as necessary responses to militia attacks on US forces, the broader context of American military presence in the region deserves scrutiny. The continued deployment of US troops in Syria and Iraq, ostensibly to prevent the resurgence of ISIS, has become increasingly questionable as ISIS’s territorial control has been eliminated. Many in the region, particularly Sunni populations who have suffered from both ISIS brutality and the excesses of Iranian-backed militias, view the American presence as an occupation that fuels rather than resolves regional tensions.
Sectarian Dimensions: Iranian Militias and Anti-Sunni Agenda
The sectarian foundation of Iranian militia operations is evident not only in their tactical choices but also in their strategic objectives. While these groups claim to resist American and Israeli influence, their actions consistently prioritize sectarian goals that target Sunni populations across the Middle East. This reality reveals the true nature of these militias as instruments of Iranian regional hegemony rather than genuine resistance movements against external interference4.
In Iraq, the integration of these militias into the state security apparatus through the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) legitimized groups with documented histories of sectarian violence against Sunni civilians. During operations to reclaim territory from ISIS, these militias committed numerous abuses against Sunni civilians, including forced displacement, extrajudicial killings, and property destruction—actions that went largely unaddressed by Iraqi authorities and their American backers24.
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In Syria, Iranian militias deployed to support the Assad regime participated in the siege and bombardment of predominantly Sunni areas that opposed the government. Cities like Aleppo, Homs, and Eastern Ghouta experienced devastating attacks that targeted civilian infrastructure including hospitals, schools, and markets. The sectarian dimension of this conflict was evident in the selective targeting of Sunni-majority areas and the preferential treatment of regions populated by religious minorities aligned with the regime3.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah has increasingly functioned as a state within a state, imposing its will on the Lebanese political system while maintaining a heavily armed militia that intimidates opposition, particularly from Sunni political movements. The group’s resistance to international investigation following the massive Beirut port explosion in August 2020 reinforced perceptions that it prioritizes its own interests and by extension, Iran’s over those of the Lebanese people, including the country’s substantial Sunni population3.
The situation within Iran itself is equally troubling, as the regime’s treatment of its Sunni minority reveals the sectarian foundation of its policies. Sunni mosques are prohibited in Tehran, and Sunni literature and teachings are banned in public schools. Construction of new Sunni mosques and schools is banned throughout the country4. In regions like Iranian Balouchistan, with significant Sunni populations, government forces have engaged in systematic repression, including extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances of Sunni leaders4.
Regional Powers and Their Response to Iranian Militia Activities
The expansion of Iranian militias across the Middle East has prompted varied responses from regional powers, each calibrated according to their particular security concerns and strategic interests. Saudi Arabia, as the preeminent Sunni power and Iran’s primary regional rival, has taken the most assertive stance against Iranian proxy expansion, viewing Tehran’s militia network as an existential threat to regional stability and its own security5.
Following years of proxy confrontation in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran reached a diplomatic détente in March 2023, brokered by China. However, the subsequent October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel and the ensuing regional conflagration strained this rapprochement, as Iran’s proxies particularly the Houthis in Yemen resumed hostile activities3. The Saudi kingdom has maintained a cautious approach, balancing between diplomatic engagement with Iran and continued vigilance against its proxy network.
The United Arab Emirates, initially aligned with Saudi Arabia in opposing Iranian influence, has pursued a more independent path in recent years, establishing diplomatic channels with Tehran while maintaining close security ties with Washington. This pragmatic approach reflects Abu Dhabi’s calculation that direct confrontation with Iran carries unacceptable risks, particularly given the vulnerability of the UAE’s critical infrastructure to attacks by Iranian proxies.
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Turkey, under President Erdogan, has navigated a complex position regarding Iranian militias. While opposing Iran’s support for the Assad regime in Syria, Turkey has found common ground with Tehran in opposing Kurdish autonomy and has cooperated on economic matters despite geopolitical differences. Turkey’s support for Sunni opposition groups in Syria placed it at odds with Iranian-backed forces, yet the two powers have maintained working relations through diplomatic channels.
Egypt and Jordan, traditional pillars of the Arab order, have watched the expansion of Iranian influence with alarm but have limited capacity to directly counter Tehran’s proxy network. Both countries have strengthened security cooperation with Israel and the Gulf states while maintaining diplomatic channels with Iran, illustrating the complex balancing act that characterizes Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015 saved the Assad regime from collapse and made Moscow a key player in the regional equation. While cooperating with Iran to preserve Assad’s rule, Russia also maintained working relations with Israel, allowing the latter to conduct strikes against Iranian targets in Syria within certain parameters. This Russian balancing act sometimes constrained Iran’s freedom of action in Syria, even as Moscow and Tehran remained tactical allies until the regime’s eventual fall in December 20243.
China’s growing presence in the Middle East, exemplified by its mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, reflects Beijing’s expanding economic interests in the region and its desire to position itself as a neutral broker5. China’s approach has been predominantly economic rather than military, though its diplomatic initiatives increasingly shape the environment in which Iranian militias operate.
Amid these complex dynamics, Sunni communities across the region have often found themselves caught between the aggressive policies of the United States and Israel on one hand, and the sectarian agenda of Iranian-backed militias on the other. The failure of regional and international powers to prioritize the protection of these communities has prolonged their suffering and contributed to continuing instability.
The 2023-2025 Gaza-Lebanon War and Its Aftermath
The conflict that erupted following Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel evolved into a protracted regional war that dramatically altered the Middle Eastern landscape. What began as Israel’s military response in Gaza expanded to encompass Lebanon, with Israeli forces engaging in extensive operations against Hezbollah, and further escalated to include strikes against Iranian-backed militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen3. This expanding conflict became the most significant regional conflagration in decades, with profound implications for Iran’s proxy network.
Israel’s military operations in Lebanon inflicted severe damage on Hezbollah, targeting its leadership, missile arsenals, and command structure. These operations, while justified by Israel as necessary security measures, resulted in extensive civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction, displacing hundreds of thousands of Lebanese citizens and further destabilizing a country already suffering from economic collapse and political paralysis3.
The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, during the height of the regional conflict, delivered a strategic blow to the Iranian axis. With Syria no longer serving as a reliable conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah, Israel achieved a significant strategic objective—the disruption of Iran’s land bridge to Lebanon3. This development isolated Hezbollah from its primary patron and compromised Iran’s ability to resupply its most capable proxy.
The ceasefire agreement that took effect on January 19, 2025, brought a tentative pause to the fighting but has not resolved the underlying conflicts that drove the escalation3. Doubts persist about whether this ceasefire will hold or merely represent a temporary lull before the next round of violence. For Iranian-backed militias, the ceasefire offered a much-needed respite but did not address the structural challenges they face following the Assad regime’s collapse and the disruption of supply lines from Iran.
Throughout the conflict, Iranian proxies demonstrated both resilience and limitations. Despite sustaining significant losses, militias in Iraq continued to launch attacks against US forces, while the Houthis in Yemen expanded their campaign against maritime shipping in the Red Sea, drawing direct US military responses. However, these groups also revealed vulnerabilities, particularly in their command structures and supply chains, that were exploited by Israeli and American military operations.
For Sunni communities across the region, the conflict brought renewed suffering and displacement. In Lebanon, Sunni areas affected by the fighting received less support from Hezbollah-dominated relief efforts, reinforcing perceptions of sectarian bias. In Syria, the chaos following Assad’s fall left many Sunni communities vulnerable to attacks from remaining regime forces and Iranian-backed militias, particularly in areas near the Lebanese border and in eastern Syria.
The war and its aftermath highlighted how US and Israeli policies, ostensibly aimed at countering Iranian influence, often exacerbate regional instability while failing to address the legitimate security concerns of all communities. The massive civilian toll of Israel’s operations in Gaza and Lebanon, coupled with the inability of the international community to broker a durable peace, underscored the bankruptcy of militarized approaches to regional security challenges.
Current Status of Major Iranian Proxies
As of early 2025, Iran’s proxy network faces unprecedented challenges following the regional war and the fall of the Assad regime. Each major component of this network has been affected differently, with some groups significantly weakened while others demonstrate surprising resilience.
Hezbollah, long considered the most capable of Iran’s proxies, emerged from the 2023-2025 conflict substantially degraded. Israeli military operations against Hezbollah’s infrastructure in Lebanon destroyed significant portions of its missile arsenal and eliminated several senior commanders. More critically, the collapse of the Assad regime disrupted Hezbollah’s primary supply line from Iran, complicating efforts to rebuild its military capabilities3. Despite these setbacks, Hezbollah retains political influence in Lebanon and continues to function as a state within a state, particularly in the southern suburbs of Beirut and areas of southern Lebanon.
In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias face mounting pressure from both external and internal forces. The Iraqi government, responding to domestic demands and international pressure, has called for these groups to disarm or fully integrate into the state security apparatus. Militia leaders like Akram al Kaabi have publicly rejected these demands, setting the stage for potential confrontation2. The presence of displaced fighters from Syria, including members of the Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zainabiyoun brigades, adds another layer of complexity to Iraq’s security landscape6.
The Houthi movement in Yemen demonstrated remarkable resilience throughout the regional conflict, expanding its capabilities to include attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and missile strikes against Israeli territory. These operations prompted direct US military responses, including airstrikes against Houthi facilities, yet failed to significantly degrade the movement’s operational capacity. The Houthis remain firmly in control of northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, and continue to receive limited support from Iran despite the disruption of traditional supply routes through Syria.
Syrian militias loyal to Iran have been scattered following Assad’s fall, with some units retreating to areas still controlled by regime remnants while others have crossed into Lebanon or Iraq3. These groups face an uncertain future as they attempt to reestablish themselves in a radically altered Syrian landscape. Many have turned increasingly to criminal activities, including smuggling and extortion, to finance their operations in the absence of regular support from Iran or the Syrian state.
The broader network of Iranian proxies has adapted to these challenges by developing more decentralized command structures and alternative supply lines. Groups in Iraq have taken on increased importance as conduits for Iranian influence, particularly as the Syrian route has become less viable2. This adaptation reflects the resilience of Iran’s proxy strategy but also its limitations in the face of determined opposition from regional and international actors.
For Sunni communities living in areas affected by these militias, the situation remains precarious. In Iraq, Sunni areas “liberated” from ISIS continue to face discrimination and limited reconstruction support, with Iranian-backed militias maintaining checkpoints that restrict movement and economic activity2. In Syria, Sunni communities that opposed the Assad regime fear retribution from regime loyalists and Iranian proxies, even as the central authority has collapsed3. In Lebanon, Sunni political representation remains constrained by Hezbollah’s dominance of the security landscape.
US and Israeli Policies: Creating the Vacuum for Iranian Exploitation
The expansion of Iranian influence through proxy militias across the Middle East cannot be understood without examining the role of US and Israeli policies in creating the conditions that enabled this development. A historical analysis reveals how successive American administrations and Israeli governments pursued strategies that, whether by design or miscalculation, destabilized the regional order and created vacuums that Iran eagerly exploited.
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq represents the most consequential American policy failure in this regard. By dismantling the Iraqi state without adequate planning for what would follow, the US created a governance vacuum that Iranian-backed groups quickly filled2. The subsequent disbanding of the Iraqi military released hundreds of thousands of trained personnel into unemployment, creating a vast pool of potential recruits for insurgent groups, including those supported by Iran. The American occupation’s inability to provide basic security and services further alienated the Iraqi population, particularly Sunnis who felt marginalized by the new political order dominated by Shia parties aligned with Tehran.
Similarly, Israel’s policies toward its neighbors, particularly Lebanon, have inadvertently strengthened Iranian proxies. Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon and subsequent 18-year occupation of southern Lebanon created the conditions for Hezbollah’s emergence as a “resistance” movement. Later Israeli military operations, including the 2006 Lebanon War, while inflicting damage on Hezbollah’s military capabilities, ultimately strengthened the group’s domestic political position by allowing it to claim credit for “resisting” Israeli aggression.
In Syria, both the US and Israel pursued policies that contributed to the country’s destabilization. American support for opposition groups fighting the Assad regime, coupled with unclear strategic objectives and inconsistent implementation, prolonged the conflict without achieving decisive outcomes. Israel’s regular airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria, while justified as necessary security measures, contributed to the overall instability that benefited Iranian-backed militias operating in the fog of war1.
More recently, the Biden administration’s approach maintained elements of previous policies while attempting to reduce direct US military involvement in the region. However, the failure to develop comprehensive diplomatic alternatives left Washington reliant on periodic military strikes that demonstrate American power without resolving underlying conflicts. The February 2024 bombardment of Iranian-linked targets in Iraq and Syria exemplifies this approach—a show of force with limited strategic impact that does not address root causes of regional instability1.
Israel’s military response to the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack expanded into a regional conflict that, despite inflicting significant damage on Iran’s proxy network, has not eliminated the threat these groups pose3. Moreover, the massive civilian toll and infrastructure destruction resulting from Israeli operations have created conditions of desperation and resentment that may fuel future recruitment for militant groups.
These policy failures highlight a fundamental misconception at the heart of American and Israeli approaches to regional security: the belief that military force alone can resolve complex political conflicts. This misconception has led to interventions that, rather than enhancing security, have destabilized the regional order and created opportunities for Iranian influence to expand through proxy militias that exploit sectarian tensions.
Future Trajectories for Iranian Militias
As the Middle East navigates the aftermath of the 2023-2025 regional war and the fall of the Assad regime, the future of Iranian militias remains uncertain. Several trajectories appear possible, each with significant implications for regional stability and the welfare of communities affected by militia activities.
The most immediate challenge facing Iran’s proxy network is the disruption of the Syrian land bridge following Assad’s fall3. This development has complicated Iran’s ability to supply and coordinate with proxies like Hezbollah, forcing Tehran to develop alternative routes and methods for maintaining influence. Iraq has assumed increased importance in this regard, with Iranian-backed elements in the Popular Mobilization Forces serving as conduits for Tehran’s regional strategy6. However, this adaptation faces resistance from both Iraqi authorities seeking to assert sovereignty and US forces targeting cross-border supply routes.
A potential trajectory involves increased decentralization of the proxy network, with local groups assuming greater operational autonomy while maintaining strategic alignment with Iranian objectives5. This evolution could make the network more resilient against decapitation strikes targeting leadership but might also lead to more unpredictable behavior as commanders make independent decisions without direct Iranian oversight. For Sunni communities living in areas where these militias operate, such decentralization could exacerbate security concerns if local commanders pursue sectarian agendas with less restraint.
Another possibility is a strategic retrenchment by Iran, focusing resources on preserving influence in core areas like Iraq while accepting reduced presence in more distant theaters like Yemen5. Economic pressures resulting from years of sanctions have strained Iran’s ability to finance its proxy network, potentially forcing difficult choices about resource allocation. Such retrenchment would not necessarily indicate abandonment of the proxy strategy but rather its recalibration to reflect changing regional realities and resource constraints.
The most optimistic trajectory would involve genuine integration of militia elements into legitimate state structures, particularly in Iraq where the government has called for armed groups to disband or fully join the security apparatus2. However, evidence suggests militia leaders remain resistant to such integration when it would diminish their autonomy and power. The experience of Lebanon, where Hezbollah has maintained a state within a state despite nominal participation in the political system, offers a cautionary tale about the challenges of converting militias into responsible political actors.
For Sunni communities across the region, the trajectory of Iranian militias carries existential implications. These communities have often found themselves caught between the aggressive policies of external powers like the United States and Israel on one hand, and the sectarian agenda of Iranian-backed militias on the other4. Their security and prosperity depend on the emergence of governance structures that represent all citizens equally, regardless of sectarian identity an outcome that neither continued militia dominance nor renewed external intervention would likely produce.
Regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkey, will play crucial roles in shaping these trajectories through their own policies toward Iran and its proxies. Saudi Arabia’s cautious diplomatic engagement with Iran reflects recognition that direct confrontation carries unacceptable risks, yet Riyadh remains fundamentally opposed to Tehran’s proxy strategy5. Turkey’s complex position—opposing Iranian influence in Syria while maintaining diplomatic and economic ties with Tehran—illustrates the multilayered nature of regional responses to the proxy challenge.
Conclusion
Iranian militias between Washington’s strikes and regional transformations face an uncertain future shaped by the dramatic events of recent years. The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 delivered a strategic blow to Iran’s regional architecture, disrupting the vital land bridge that facilitated support to proxies like Hezbollah3. American military pressure, exemplified by the February 2024 airstrikes against militia targets in Iraq and Syria, has imposed costs on the proxy network without fundamentally undermining its resilience1. The 2023-2025 regional war that began with Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel expanded to engulf multiple theaters where Iranian proxies operate, altering the strategic landscape in ways still being absorbed by all actors3.
Throughout these developments, a fundamental truth has been repeatedly demonstrated: despite rhetoric focusing on resistance to American and Israeli influence, Iranian-backed militias consistently prioritize sectarian agendas that target Sunni populations across the region4. From Iraq to Syria, Lebanon to Yemen, these groups have implemented policies and carried out operations that marginalize and persecute Sunni communities, revealing their true nature as instruments of Iranian regional hegemony rather than authentic resistance movements.
The expansion of Iranian influence through proxy militias cannot be separated from the destabilizing policies pursued by the United States and Israel over decades. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, in particular, created conditions that Iran eagerly exploited, transforming the regional balance of power and empowering sectarian actors aligned with Tehran2. Similar policy failures in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere contributed to regional instability that benefited Iranian proxies operating in the resulting chaos.
As the Middle East navigates the aftermath of recent conflicts, the future trajectory of Iranian militias will depend on multiple factors: Tehran’s ability to adapt to the loss of the Syrian land bridge, the willingness of militia leaders to integrate into legitimate state structures, the approach taken by regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and the evolution of American and Israeli policies toward Iran and its proxies5. The outcome of these intersecting dynamics will shape regional stability for years to come.
For Sunni communities that have suffered from both external intervention and militia persecution, genuine security requires governance structures that represent all citizens equally, regardless of sectarian identity4. Achieving this objective necessitates moving beyond the false binary of choosing between Iranian proxies or American-Israeli dominance toward indigenous solutions that reflect the region’s diversity and shared aspirations for stability and prosperity.
The lesson of recent decades is clear: military-centric approaches to regional challenges, whether pursued by Iran through proxy militias or by the United States and Israel through direct intervention, have failed to produce sustainable security13. Only by addressing the legitimate grievances of all communities and building inclusive political systems can the Middle East transcend the cycle of conflict that has caused so much suffering across the region.
