A war between the United States and Iran would dramatically reshape global geopolitics, drawing immediate and consequential reactions from major powers like China and Russia. As tensions escalate between Washington and Tehran in 2025, understanding how Beijing and Moscow would respond to such a conflict becomes critically important for anticipating the broader international implications. Both nations maintain significant economic, political, and strategic ties with Iran that would inevitably influence their responses to American military action. Recent developments, including trilateral talks and diplomatic maneuvers, provide important context for analyzing the potential reactions of these global powers should hostilities erupt between the US and Iran.
Current State of US-Iran Relations
The relationship between the United States and Iran has entered a new phase of tension under President Donald Trump’s second administration. Following his return to office, Trump has adopted an increasingly aggressive stance toward Iran, reminiscent of his first term’s approach. In a recent effort to initiate negotiations, Trump sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, presenting what appears to be an ultimatum. The letter suggested that “there are two ways Iran can be handled,” implying military action as an alternative to diplomatic engagement3. This direct communication follows a pattern of alternating between threats and offers of negotiations that characterized Trump’s earlier approach to Iran.
The nuclear issue remains at the center of US-Iran tensions in 2025. Having withdrawn from the 2015 nuclear deal during his first term, Trump has consistently maintained that the agreement was insufficiently restrictive on Iran’s nuclear program and that sanctions relief enabled Iran to fund proxy groups like Hamas and Hezbollah3. The current administration appears determined to force Iran into a more restrictive agreement, using the threat of military action as leverage. This approach has significantly raised the possibility of armed conflict, with Israeli strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities seeming “closer than ever” according to recent assessments2.
The high-stakes diplomacy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program continues to evolve rapidly in 2025, with Trump’s administration giving Tehran a two-month ultimatum to sign a new nuclear agreement or “face serious consequences”2. This deadline-driven approach has heightened concerns about potential military confrontation between the two nations, particularly as Iran continues to advance its nuclear capabilities despite international pressure.
China’s Strategic Interests in Iran
China has developed deep and multifaceted ties with Iran that would be severely threatened by a US-Iran war. As Iran’s largest trading partner and the primary buyer of Iranian oil, China has substantial economic interests in maintaining stability in the region1. These commercial relationships have only grown more important for both nations since international sanctions against Iran have limited its trading options with Western powers. Chinese investments in Iran’s energy sector and infrastructure remain significant, making any disruption to the Iranian economy directly harmful to Chinese interests.
Beyond purely economic considerations, Iran plays a crucial role in China’s broader regional strategy, particularly regarding its Belt and Road Initiative. Iran’s geographic position makes it a vital link in China’s plans to expand trade and influence across Eurasia. The Chinese government has invested considerably in developing transportation networks through Iran as part of the North-South Transport Corridor, a multinational project that has taken on even greater significance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 20222.
The relationship between Beijing and Tehran has also evolved into an important political counterweight to Western influence in the Middle East. China has repeatedly supported Iran in international forums, most recently during high-level talks in Beijing in March 2025, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed a five-point plan for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. This plan specifically called for ending sanctions, restarting multinational talks, and using the 2015 nuclear deal as the foundation for future negotiations3. During these talks, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu explicitly stated that “the relevant parties should be committed to addressing the root cause of the current situation and abandoning sanction, pressure, or threat of force”3. This clearly signaled China’s opposition to the United States’ coercive approach toward Iran.
China’s consistent diplomatic support for Iran reflects a strategic calculation that maintaining this relationship serves its long-term geopolitical interests, particularly as competition with the United States intensifies across multiple domains. A war between the US and Iran would force China to make difficult choices between protecting its economic interests in Iran and avoiding direct confrontation with the United States.
Russia’s Complex Relationship with Iran
Russia’s relationship with Iran has transformed significantly in recent years, evolving from cautious engagement to what now resembles a strategic partnership. Following Russia’s isolation by Western powers after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has prioritized strengthening ties with Tehran2. Iran has become not only an important economic partner but also a crucial military ally, providing Russia with drones and other military equipment for use in Ukraine.
Despite this growing alignment, the relationship remains characterized by mutual wariness rooted in historical tensions. As noted in recent analyses, “suspicions between Russia and Iran” have deep historical roots, including “the military interventions by the Russian Empire and Soviet Union in Iran” and Moscow’s past willingness to support UN resolutions targeting Iran’s nuclear program2. This underlying caution continues to influence how Iranian leaders view Russian reliability, particularly when Moscow’s interests might be better served by improving relations with the West.
The current rapprochement between Russia and the United States, which began following Trump’s return to office, has heightened Iranian concerns about potentially becoming “a bargaining chip in the diplomatic back-and-forth between Moscow and Washington”2. These fears intensified after a recent telephone conversation between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, during which both leaders reportedly “shared the view that Iran should never be in a position to destroy Israel”2. This statement, while seemingly anodyne to Western audiences, raised alarm in Tehran that Russia might be willing to sacrifice Iranian interests to achieve broader geopolitical objectives, particularly the easing of Western sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russia’s calculations regarding a potential US-Iran war would be complex. While Moscow would likely condemn American military action and might provide certain forms of support to Iran, it also has reasons to avoid direct involvement in such a conflict. Russia has consistently opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including to Iran, while simultaneously rejecting any Western-led regime change efforts that might destabilize the current Iranian government2. This balanced position reflects Russia’s desire to maintain influence in the region without triggering escalation that could threaten its own security interests.
China’s Potential Response to a US-Iran War
In the event of war between the United States and Iran, China’s response would likely prioritize protecting its economic interests while avoiding direct military confrontation with American forces. Beijing would almost certainly launch an immediate and forceful diplomatic campaign condemning US military action, leveraging its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to attempt to pass resolutions demanding an end to hostilities. Such diplomatic efforts would align with China’s broader strategy of positioning itself as a defender of national sovereignty against Western intervention.
Economically, China would face difficult decisions regarding compliance with any new or intensified US sanctions against Iran. While Chinese companies and banks have previously adjusted their activities to avoid American secondary sanctions, a full-scale war would likely prompt Beijing to develop more robust mechanisms for continuing trade with Iran outside the US-dominated financial system. This could include expanded use of currency swap arrangements, barter trade, and other alternative payment mechanisms that China has been developing to reduce its vulnerability to US financial pressure.
China would also likely increase humanitarian assistance to Iran, both as a symbolic gesture of support and as a practical means of maintaining influence in the country. Such aid would be prominently featured in Chinese state media as evidence of China’s commitment to supporting nations facing “Western aggression,” reinforcing domestic and international narratives about China’s rise as a more responsible global power than the United States.
Military support would be more measured and calibrated to avoid direct confrontation with US forces. China might provide Iran with intelligence, cybersecurity support, and possibly certain defensive weapons systems through covert channels, but would almost certainly stop short of entering the conflict directly. This cautious approach reflects China’s long-standing preference for advancing its interests through economic and diplomatic means rather than military confrontation, particularly when dealing with the United States.
Perhaps most significantly for global geopolitics, China would likely use a US-Iran war as an opportunity to accelerate efforts to build alternative international institutions and norms that reduce American influence. Beijing has already been promoting concepts like “a new type of international relations” and “a community with a shared future for mankind” as alternatives to the US-led liberal international order. A war widely perceived as another example of American unilateralism would provide China with powerful rhetorical ammunition to advance these alternative visions among Global South nations skeptical of Western military interventions.
Russia’s Potential Response to US-Iran Military Conflict
Russia’s response to a war between the United States and Iran would be shaped by a complex set of competing interests. In the immediate term, Moscow would join Beijing in forcefully condemning US military action through diplomatic channels and in international forums. Russian officials would likely frame such a conflict as further evidence of American imperialism and disregard for international law, themes that resonate with Russia’s broader foreign policy narrative.
However, the Kremlin’s practical response would be more calculated than its rhetorical position might suggest. As clearly indicated in recent analyses, “There’s no way Russia will try to protect Iran from an attack: the risk of a direct confrontation with the United States and Israel would be too great”2. Despite supplying Iran with certain military equipment, Russia recognizes that “a few air defense units and fighter jets cannot save Tehran from the combined might of the United States and Israel”2. This limitation means that Russia’s military support would likely remain limited to intelligence sharing, cyber operations, and possibly the covert provision of certain defensive systems.
More pragmatically, Russia might attempt to leverage the crisis to advance its own interests in negotiations with the United States, particularly regarding Ukraine. As noted in recent reporting, “it makes more sense to package its neutrality [regarding Iran] as a concession to Washington that might help the two sides reach a more wide-ranging agreement over the Ukraine war”2. This approach aligns with Russia’s broader pattern of opportunistically using international crises to achieve specific geopolitical objectives.
Economically, Russia would likely deepen its trade with Iran through alternative payment channels similar to those it has developed to circumvent Western sanctions on its own economy. Having been subjected to extensive sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has already created significant infrastructure for conducting international commerce outside Western-controlled financial systems. These mechanisms could be expanded and offered to Iran as a means of mitigating the economic impact of war and any accompanying intensification of sanctions.
In the energy sector specifically, Russia might benefit from the short-term spike in oil prices that would likely follow a disruption of Iranian exports. However, this advantage would be balanced against the longer-term risk of accelerated Western efforts to reduce dependence on fossil fuels, which would threaten Russia’s economic model. This mixed impact on Russian interests illustrates the complex calculations Moscow would need to make in formulating its response.
Joint China-Russia Actions in Response to US-Iran Conflict
A war between the United States and Iran would likely accelerate existing trends toward greater China-Russia coordination in challenging American global leadership. The two powers have already demonstrated their willingness to cooperate regarding Iran, as evidenced by their joint participation with Iranian officials in trilateral talks held in Beijing in March 20253. During these discussions, they collectively called for an end to US sanctions on Tehran and the restart of nuclear negotiations based on the 2015 agreement.
This existing framework of cooperation provides a foundation for a coordinated response should war erupt. Both nations would likely convene emergency consultations at the highest levels, potentially resulting in a joint declaration condemning US actions and calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. Through their positions on the UN Security Council, China and Russia would work in tandem to obstruct any American efforts to secure international legitimacy for military action against Iran.
Beyond diplomatic coordination, China and Russia might establish a joint working group to coordinate economic support for Iran, leveraging their complementary capabilities. China’s vast financial resources and industrial capacity could be combined with Russia’s experience in sanctions evasion and energy sector expertise to help Iran withstand the economic shock of war and accompanying sanctions. This economic lifeline would be crucial not only for Iran but also for preserving Chinese and Russian investments and influence in the country.
The two powers might also intensify their already substantial military cooperation, conducting joint exercises or deployments that, while not directly related to the Iran conflict, would signal their mutual commitment to constraining American power projection capabilities. Naval exercises in the Indian Ocean or joint air patrols in the Pacific could force the United States to divert military resources from the Middle East, indirectly supporting Iran by complicating American operational planning.
Perhaps most consequentially for the global order, China and Russia would likely use the crisis to accelerate their promotion of alternative international institutions and norms. The existing BRICS framework (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), which has recently expanded to include Iran, could serve as one platform for coordinating a non-Western response to the conflict. Similarly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation might be leveraged to demonstrate solidarity among non-Western powers concerned about American unilateralism.
Impact on Global Energy Markets and Economic Stability
A war between the United States and Iran would send immediate shockwaves through global energy markets, with profound implications for China, Russia, and the broader world economy. Iran remains a significant oil producer despite years of sanctions, and any disruption to its exports would likely trigger a substantial spike in global oil prices. This price shock would be amplified if the conflict involved attacks on oil infrastructure elsewhere in the Gulf region or threats to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of global oil supplies pass.
For China, as the world’s largest oil importer and Iran’s biggest petroleum customer, the economic impact would be immediately negative. Higher energy prices would increase inflationary pressures in the Chinese economy, potentially forcing Beijing to choose between supporting growth and controlling inflation. These economic challenges would come at a particularly sensitive time for China’s leadership, which has been struggling to manage the country’s transition to a new growth model less dependent on real estate investment and exports.
Russia, conversely, might see short-term economic benefits from higher oil prices, as it remains one of the world’s largest petroleum exporters despite Western sanctions. However, these gains would be balanced against potential disruptions to Russia’s own energy exports to China and other Asian markets if the conflict expanded to affect global shipping lanes. Moreover, a prolonged period of high energy prices might accelerate Western investments in renewable energy and efforts to reduce fossil fuel dependence, threatening Russia’s long-term economic model.
Beyond the energy sector, global financial markets would likely experience significant volatility in response to a US-Iran war. Stock markets would probably decline sharply, at least initially, while safe-haven assets like gold and certain government bonds would see increased demand. This financial turbulence would complicate economic management for all major powers, potentially requiring coordinated central bank interventions to maintain market stability.
Trade flows would also face disruption, particularly for countries heavily dependent on Gulf oil or with significant commercial relationships with Iran. China would be among the most affected, given its position as Iran’s largest trading partner. Chinese companies have invested heavily in Iranian infrastructure, manufacturing, and resource extraction, and these investments would be at risk in a conflict scenario. Russia’s growing economic ties with Iran, developed partly as a response to Western sanctions on both countries, would similarly be threatened.
Nuclear Dimensions of a US-Iran Conflict
The nuclear dimension of a potential US-Iran war adds layers of complexity and risk that would profoundly influence Chinese and Russian calculations. Recent reports indicate that “an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program seems closer than ever”2, suggesting that concerns about Iranian nuclear capabilities have reached a critical point. Both China and Russia have consistently opposed Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons while also rejecting military action as a solution to the issue.
China has proposed a “five-point plan for ‘the proper settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue,'” which includes “ending sanctions, restarting multinational talks, and using the 2015 Iran nuclear deal as the basis of future negotiations”3. This approach reflects China’s preference for diplomatic solutions that preserve stability and protect its economic interests in Iran. A US military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities would represent a direct rejection of this Chinese position, potentially damaging Beijing’s credibility as a rising global power and alternative to American leadership.
Russia’s position is similarly nuanced. As explicitly stated in recent analyses, “Moscow does not want to see Iran acquire a nuclear weapon”2. However, Russia also opposes military action that could lead to regime change or civil war in Iran, outcomes that “would jeopardize all of Russia’s investments in Iran in recent years”2. Russia’s ideal scenario would involve serving as a mediator in talks between Washington and Tehran, potentially “given the role of ensuring the implementation of such a deal”2. This would enhance Russia’s international prestige while preserving its influence in Iran.
A US attack specifically targeting Iranian nuclear facilities would present both powers with difficult choices. They would need to balance their opposition to Iranian nuclear weapons against their even stronger opposition to American military intervention and regime change efforts. In practice, this might lead to a bifurcated response where China and Russia condemn American military action while simultaneously pressuring Iran to accept limitations on its nuclear program as part of a ceasefire agreement.
The risk of nuclear proliferation following a US-Iran conflict would also concern both Moscow and Beijing. If Iran were to accelerate its nuclear program in response to American attacks, or if other regional powers like Saudi Arabia were to pursue nuclear weapons in response to Iranian advances, the resulting proliferation cascade would threaten strategic stability in a region vital to both Chinese and Russian interests. This concern might motivate both powers to engage more actively in crisis diplomacy than they otherwise might.
Regional Implications and Proxy Conflicts
A war between the United States and Iran would inevitably trigger regional dynamics that would further complicate Chinese and Russian responses. Iran has developed a sophisticated network of proxy forces and allied groups throughout the Middle East, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militia groups in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen. These proxy forces represent a significant asymmetric capability that Iran would almost certainly activate in the event of American military action.
The resulting regionalization of conflict would present both challenges and opportunities for China and Russia. China’s expanding economic interests throughout the Middle East, including significant investments in infrastructure and energy projects in Gulf states aligned with the United States, would be threatened by widening instability. This exposure might limit Beijing’s willingness to openly support Iran, as doing so could endanger Chinese relationships with wealthy Gulf monarchies that have historically relied on American security guarantees.
Russia, with its more established military presence in the region, particularly in Syria, would face different calculations. Moscow has worked to position itself as a mediator trusted by all regional powers, including Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. A US-Iran war would test this balancing act, potentially forcing Russia to make choices that would alienate some of these partners. As explicitly acknowledged in recent assessments, Russia would likely seek to “reassure the United States that it will not get involved if Washington enters a military standoff with Iran”2. This restraint would aim to preserve Russia’s broader regional position while potentially extracting concessions from Washington on other issues, particularly Ukraine.
Both powers would be concerned about the humanitarian consequences of regional conflict, including potential refugee flows that could destabilize neighboring countries. Russia’s experience with refugee crises stemming from Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts has demonstrated the potential for such population movements to create political complications and strain resources. Similarly, China’s growing economic presence in the region would be affected by humanitarian emergencies that disrupt labor markets and consume government resources that might otherwise be directed toward development projects involving Chinese companies.
The historical context of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) provides important insight into how regional conflicts can shape long-term power dynamics. That conflict claimed at least one million lives and set the stage for “far-reaching and lasting regional dynamics”4. In the aftermath, “Iran has developed a marked capacity to mobilize Shiite communities across the region, penetrating previously impervious political and ideological spaces, particularly in Iraq but also in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen”4. This expansion of Iranian influence through proxy networks began during that war and has expanded significantly in recent decades, particularly in Syria and Yemen4.
Diplomatic Initiatives and De-escalation Efforts
In the event of war between the United States and Iran, both China and Russia would likely launch immediate diplomatic initiatives aimed at de-escalation, though their motivations and approaches would differ. China, with its growing economic stake in regional stability, would probably position itself as a neutral mediator seeking to protect commercial interests and broader peace. Russia, leveraging its more established military and diplomatic presence in the Middle East, might adopt a more directly involved approach while still avoiding military entanglement.
China’s diplomatic response would build upon its recent initiatives, such as the March 2025 trilateral talks with Russia and Iran held in Beijing3. During those discussions, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented a five-point plan for resolving the Iranian nuclear issue diplomatically. In a conflict scenario, China would likely expand this framework into a more comprehensive peace initiative, potentially hosting emergency talks involving regional powers and other stakeholders. Beijing’s diplomatic strategy would emphasize the economic costs of conflict and the benefits of stability, themes that align with China’s broader international messaging.
Russia’s approach might involve more direct engagement with both Washington and Tehran, leveraging its relationships with both to position itself as an indispensable mediator. As noted in recent analyses, “an ideal outcome for Moscow would be if it were involved in a nuclear agreement between Tehran and Washington—perhaps given the role of ensuring the implementation of such a deal”2. This mediating role would serve multiple Russian interests, including demonstrating Moscow’s global importance, potentially securing sanctions relief as part of broader negotiations, and preserving its influence in Iran.
Both powers would likely coordinate their diplomatic efforts through the United Nations, using their positions as permanent Security Council members to advance peace proposals and obstruct any American attempts to secure international legitimacy for military action. This coordination might extend to joint statements, concurrent diplomatic initiatives, or even a comprehensive peace plan presented as an alternative to continued conflict.
Regional powers would inevitably be drawn into these diplomatic maneuvers. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and the Gulf states all have substantial stakes in the outcome of any US-Iran conflict, and both China and Russia maintain important relationships with these countries that they would seek to leverage in pursuit of a resolution. China’s growing economic influence in the Gulf and Russia’s military presence in Syria provide both powers with significant regional legitimacy that could be deployed in service of crisis diplomacy.
The effectiveness of these diplomatic initiatives would depend partly on the willingness of the United States and Iran to engage with them. American receptivity would be influenced by the military situation on the ground, domestic political considerations, and the Biden administration’s broader strategic calculations regarding China and Russia. Iranian willingness to participate would similarly reflect battlefield developments, internal political dynamics, and assessments of whether Chinese and Russian mediation offered a better outcome than continued resistance or direct negotiations with Washington.
Long-term Geopolitical Implications
A war between the United States and Iran would have profound and lasting consequences for the global geopolitical landscape, potentially accelerating existing trends toward multipolarity and the erosion of American hegemony. For China and Russia, the long-term implications would extend far beyond the immediate regional impact, affecting their strategic positioning, relationships with the United States, and roles in the evolving international order.
For China, a US-Iran war would likely reinforce Beijing’s perception that American power remains a fundamentally destabilizing force in regions critical to Chinese interests. This perception would further motivate Chinese efforts to develop alternative security arrangements and economic structures less vulnerable to American disruption. The Belt and Road Initiative, already a centerpiece of Chinese foreign policy, might be expanded and accelerated as a framework for building an international order less dominated by the United States and its allies.
Russia would likely draw similar conclusions about the necessity of building alternatives to American-led international institutions. Moscow’s experience with Western sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine has already prompted greater Russian interest in developing financial systems, trade relationships, and diplomatic frameworks less dependent on Western participation or approval. A US-Iran war, particularly one undertaken without broad international support, would strengthen Russian arguments for such alternative structures and potentially increase their appeal to countries in the Global South skeptical of American power.
Both powers would likely intensify their cooperation with each other and with other non-Western states in the aftermath of a US-Iran conflict. The existing BRICS framework, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and other multilateral groupings that exclude the United States might be strengthened and expanded. Iran itself, assuming it survived the conflict with its current government intact, would almost certainly deepen its integration into these alternative structures, potentially becoming even more dependent on Chinese and Russian support.
The credibility of American security guarantees might be questioned by traditional US allies if the conflict produced ambiguous results or significant American casualties. Countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have already begun hedging their strategic bets by improving relations with China and Russia, might accelerate this diversification. China, with its growing economic influence in the Gulf, would be well-positioned to exploit any erosion of confidence in American security commitments.
For the broader international system, a US-Iran war might represent another significant step in the transition from the post-Cold War period of uncontested American hegemony toward a more multipolar order characterized by competing centers of power and influence. China and Russia would seek to position themselves as leaders in this emerging order, offering alternatives to American leadership that emphasize state sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and economic development without political conditionality.
Conclusion
A war between the United States and Iran would present both challenges and opportunities for China and Russia, forcing both powers to navigate complex and sometimes contradictory interests. Their responses would be shaped by economic considerations, strategic calculations, historical relationships, and domestic politics, producing nuanced positions that might not align neatly with either American or Iranian preferences.
China, as Iran’s largest trading partner and a rising global power with expanding interests in the Middle East, would face particular challenges in balancing its economic stake in Iran against its broader relationship with the United States and Gulf Arab states. Beijing would likely condemn American military action while simultaneously pressuring Iran to accept limitations on its nuclear program as part of a negotiated settlement. Chinese diplomatic initiatives would emphasize the economic costs of conflict and the benefits of stability, themes consistent with China’s broader international messaging.
Russia, with its more established military presence in the region and complex relationship with Iran, would adopt a similarly nuanced approach.
Moscow would condemn American unilateralism while avoiding direct military involvement that could lead to confrontation with the United States. Russia would likely attempt to leverage the crisis to advance other objectives, particularly regarding Ukraine and Western sanctions, while positioning itself as an indispensable mediator in any eventual peace process.
Both powers would use the crisis to accelerate their promotion of alternative international institutions and norms, presenting themselves as more responsible global actors than the United States. The existing frameworks of cooperation between China, Russia, and other non-Western powers would be strengthened, potentially accelerating the transition toward a more multipolar international order.
The nuclear dimension of the conflict would add particular complexity, as both China and Russia oppose both Iranian nuclear weapons acquisition and American military action. This tension would likely produce diplomatic initiatives aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on Iran’s nuclear program through negotiations rather than force, potentially with Chinese or Russian guarantees as part of a settlement.
As recent history has demonstrated, wars often produce unintended consequences and unforeseen developments that can reshape regional and global politics for decades. The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988, for example, established patterns of Iranian proxy warfare and regional influence that continue to shape Middle Eastern politics today4. A US-Iran war in 2025 would similarly set in motion dynamics that would influence international relations long after the immediate conflict ended, potentially accelerating fundamental changes in the global distribution of power and the norms governing international behavior.
