How strong is Europe’s capability to confront Russia without the American umbrella? This question has grown more pressing as geopolitical shifts reshape the transatlantic security relationship. With Russia gearing up for potential conflict with European democracies, as highlighted by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and the United States, under President Donald Trump, hinting at a possible disengagement from NATO, European nations face unprecedented threats to their security and sovereignty. Europe’s capability to deter and confront Russian aggression is now more reliant on its own resources and strategies, as traditional American support becomes less certain. This essay delves into Europe’s evolving defense posture, strategic initiatives, military strength, and political resolve as it navigates the challenges of potentially standing alone against Russia.
The Changing Geopolitical Landscape
The European security environment in early 2025 is marked by heightened tensions and fundamental uncertainty regarding the traditional security architecture that has underpinned European stability since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine, now entering its fourth year, has reshaped European security perceptions and priorities. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen recently warned that “Russia has significantly augmented its military-industrial production capabilities… This funding supports its aggressive conflict in Ukraine while also gearing up for potential confrontations with European democracies”4. This stark assessment from one of Europe’s top leaders underscores the severity of the threat perception throughout the continent.
Simultaneously, the transatlantic partnership, long the bedrock of European security, has entered a period of unprecedented uncertainty. The second Trump administration has demonstrated increasing skepticism toward NATO, with the president frequently questioning its value and threatening to disregard Article 5 commitments for allies not meeting defense spending targets. Even more concerningly, influential figures close to President Trump have openly advocated for American withdrawal from the alliance. Elon Musk, head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) and a key advisor to President Trump, recently stated that the United States “really should” exit NATO, arguing that it “doesn’t make sense for America to pay for the defense of Europe”7.
These developments have created a sense of urgency among European leaders to reconsider their security arrangements. In what would have been unthinkable just a few years ago, Friedrich Merz, poised to become Germany’s next chancellor according to polls, has suggested that his country would need to look beyond the United States to Britain and France for nuclear safeguards, stating that under Trump, America could no longer be relied upon1. This represents a seismic shift in thinking for Germany, historically one of the most steadfast proponents of transatlantic security cooperation.
The European Union has responded to these challenges with unprecedented initiatives to bolster its defense capabilities. A special European Council meeting on March 6, 2025, took place “in a tense geopolitical climate, while confidence in the traditional guarantor of transatlantic security, the United States, was weakened”2. This meeting marked “a decisive step toward a massive strengthening of the European defense technological and industrial base” through the “ReArm Europe” plan, which aims to mobilize up to 800 billion euros for defense2.
The EU has also formally recognized Russia as a “fundamental threat” in its White Paper for European Defense, published by the European Commission3. This document outlines a strategic development plan to strengthen both EU and Ukrainian defense capabilities over the next five years, representing a significant hardening of the EU’s position toward Russia.
Current European Defense Capabilities
Europe’s ability to confront Russia without American support depends fundamentally on its existing defense capabilities and infrastructure. As of 2025, there exists significant variation in military strength, readiness, and investment across European states, though the overall trend indicates growing capabilities in response to the Russian threat.
According to the European Commission, “Average EU expenditure on defence has significantly increased in the past 10 years, now collectively reaching the 2% of GDP NATO target”8. This represents a notable achievement for European defense spending, which had consistently fallen short of NATO benchmarks for decades. However, the same source notes that “important differences remain across Member States and defence expenditure will have to further increase substantially to meet current and future security challenges”8.
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A key concern identified in European defense planning is the presence of “critical capability gaps” that need to be addressed to build “a strong defense industrial base”3. The European Commission’s White Paper outlines “seven priority defense issues for the Union’s member countries, which currently have gaps and will be crucial in the future for building a reliable European defense”3. These gaps likely include strategic lift capabilities, integrated air defense systems, advanced electronic warfare capabilities, and secure communications infrastructure – areas where Europe has traditionally relied heavily on American support.
The fragmentation of European defense procurement and production has been a persistent challenge to building cohesive capabilities. Increased defense spending “has only to a limited extent benefitted European manufacturers”8. This suggests that European defense procurement continues to be directed partly toward non-European suppliers, potentially including American defense companies, which would complicate efforts to achieve strategic autonomy.
The European Commission’s ReArm Europe Plan, announced on March 4, 2025, aims to address these infrastructure and capability gaps by mobilizing “close to EUR 800 billion for a safe and resilient Europe”8. This plan recognizes that “the necessary rebuilding of European defence following decades of underinvestment and the indispensable ramping-up of European defence industry production capacity require an urgent increase in European defence spending”8.
The ReArm Europe Initiative: Pathway to Strategic Autonomy
The ReArm Europe initiative represents the most ambitious and comprehensive European defense project in generations. Announced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on March 4, 2025, this plan could “mobilise close to EUR 800 billion for a safe and resilient Europe”8. The scale of this investment reflects the gravity with which European leaders view the current security situation and their determination to develop autonomous defense capabilities.
The initiative emerges from the recognition that “Europe needs to take responsibility for its security and defence, to ensure peace through deterrence”8. This marks a significant evolution in European strategic thinking, acknowledging that the continent can no longer rely unconditionally on American security guarantees and must develop indigenous capabilities to deter and, if necessary, confront Russian aggression.
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The ReArm Europe plan operates alongside a comprehensive strategic document, the White Paper for European Defense, which outlines “a new approach to defense and investment needs”3. This approach addresses both “Ukraine’s short-term urgent support” and “long-term needs for strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities”3. The dual focus on supporting Ukraine while simultaneously building European capabilities demonstrates the interconnectedness of these security challenges in European strategic thinking.
A key component of the initiative is its financial innovation. The plan proposes “unprecedented recourse to financial instruments capable of mobilizing up to 800 billion euros for defense”2. These mechanisms include EU-backed loans, with “Up to €150 billion ($163 billion) in EU-backed loans would be made available for joint procurement from the European defense industry by two or [more member states]”9. This represents a significant step toward collective European financing of defense capabilities.
The initiative also addresses the regulatory and industrial policy aspects of European defense development. The special European Council meeting discussed “the issue of legal simplification for the defense industries and on the rapid implementation of the promised financial instruments”2. This suggests efforts to streamline procurement procedures, reduce regulatory barriers to defense industrial cooperation, and accelerate the deployment of financial resources to priority areas.
The Nuclear Dimension: European Deterrence Without America
The question of nuclear deterrence stands at the heart of Europe’s ability to confront Russia without American support. Russia possesses the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and nuclear weapons have played an increasingly prominent role in Russian military doctrine and political signaling since the invasion of Ukraine. Without the American nuclear umbrella, Europe’s ability to deter Russian nuclear threats becomes a critical strategic challenge.
Currently, only two European powers possess nuclear weapons: France, with its independent nuclear deterrent, and the United Kingdom, which maintains nuclear capabilities but is no longer an EU member following Brexit. The French Force de Frappe consists of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles, providing a credible if limited deterrent compared to American or Russian capabilities.
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A groundbreaking development in European strategic thinking has emerged with “Europe’s politicians openly discussing how they could tackle the threat of nuclear attack without American help”1. This represents “a dramatic sign of the deep crisis engulfing the transatlantic alliance under Donald Trump”1. The most significant statement came from Friedrich Merz, the likely next German chancellor, who indicated that “his country would need to look beyond the U.S. to Britain and France for nuclear safeguards”1. Under Trump, Merz stated, “America could no longer be relied on”1.
This potential shift in Germany’s position on nuclear deterrence is particularly noteworthy given the country’s traditional reluctance to engage with nuclear weapons policy. Germany has historically been one of the most committed proponents of nuclear disarmament and has relied exclusively on the American nuclear umbrella for deterrence. Merz’s statement suggests a fundamental reconsideration of this position in light of changing transatlantic relations and the Russian threat.
The development of a European nuclear deterrent independent of American support would represent the most profound transformation of the continent’s security architecture since the formation of NATO. While still at an early stage of discussion rather than implementation, the fact that this conversation has moved from academic speculation to statements by mainstream political leaders indicates the depth of Europe’s security concerns and the seriousness with which it is reconsidering its strategic posture.
Economic and Energy Security Dimensions
Europe’s ability to confront Russia extends beyond purely military considerations to encompass economic and energy security dimensions. Russia has historically leveraged Europe’s energy dependence as a strategic tool, and economic interdependence has complicated European responses to Russian aggression.
The search results reveal ongoing concerns in this area. During preparations for the March 6, 2025 special European Council meeting, “Slovakia… criticized these initiatives, demanding a guarantee of maintaining gas flows through Ukrainian territory to safeguard its energy interests”2. This indicates that energy security remains a significant consideration in European policy toward Russia and Ukraine, with some member states particularly vulnerable to disruptions in energy supplies.
Europe has made substantial progress in reducing its dependence on Russian energy since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, diversifying suppliers and accelerating the transition to renewable energy sources. However, the continued concerns expressed by countries like Slovakia suggest that this transition remains incomplete, with some European states still reliant on Russian gas flowing through Ukrainian transit routes.
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The economic dimension of European security vis-à-vis Russia also includes sanctions policy. The effectiveness of these sanctions without American participation would be a critical consideration for European strategic autonomy, as U.S. financial power and global influence have historically been crucial to enforcing international sanctions regimes.
European economic security also relates to defense industrial capacity. As noted previously, “increased defense spending has only to a limited extent benefitted European manufacturers”8. This suggests potential economic leakage from European defense efforts, with funds flowing to non-European suppliers rather than strengthening the continent’s defense industrial base. The ReArm Europe initiative aims to address this through joint procurement from European manufacturers, which would both enhance military capabilities and strengthen the European defense economy.
An interesting development mentioned in the search results is the potential for the “Capital Markets Union [to] mobilize private savings for defense, provided there is acceptance of the inherent risks in this sector”2. This suggests efforts to tap into European private capital markets to fund defense investments, which would represent a significant innovation in European defense financing and could reduce dependence on public budgets alone.
NATO’s Uncertain Future
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the cornerstone of European security since its founding in 1949, with American leadership and military capabilities at its core. A potential American disengagement from the alliance would necessitate a fundamental reimagining of NATO’s role and structure, or the development of alternative security arrangements.
President Trump “has been critical of NATO, with the president frequently questioning its value and pushing allies to increase their defense spending”7. More concerning for European security planners, Trump “has recently suggested that the U.S. might not abide by one of the core tenets of the agreement, mutual defense, if an attacked country doesn’t contribute enough in defense spending”7.
Even more dramatically, influential figures in the Trump administration have openly advocated for American withdrawal from NATO. Elon Musk, described as “a key power player in the Trump administration and head of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE),” has “voiced support for the United States leaving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)”7. Specifically, Musk stated that the U.S. “really should” exit the alliance, arguing that it “doesn’t make sense for America to pay for the defense of Europe”7.
These developments have prompted European reconsideration of security arrangements. Friedrich Merz, the likely next German chancellor, has indicated that “his country would need to look beyond the U.S. to Britain and France for nuclear safeguards”1. This suggests potential for a European pillar within NATO to assume greater responsibility, or possibly the development of alternative European security structures if the U.S. were to substantially disengage.
The evolution of NATO in a context of reduced American commitment could take several forms. One possibility would be a more Europeanized NATO, with European members assuming greater responsibility for command structures, capabilities, and operations within the existing alliance framework. Another option would be the development of parallel European security structures, potentially centered on EU defense initiatives, while maintaining NATO as a framework for transatlantic cooperation on issues of mutual interest.
The search results reference “the permanent EU-NATO arrangements, particularly the Berlin Plus agreements” as one approach to enhancing EU operational capabilities5. These agreements, which allow the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which NATO as a whole is not engaged, could potentially be expanded or modified to facilitate greater European security autonomy while maintaining some connection to NATO structures.
Key European Powers and Their Evolving Defense Postures
Europe’s ability to confront Russia without American support would depend significantly on the capabilities and postures of its major powers. While the search results provide limited specific information on individual countries’ current defense positions, they do offer insights into the evolving approaches of key European states.
Germany, traditionally reluctant to assume a leading security role due to historical constraints, appears to be undergoing a significant shift in its strategic thinking. Friedrich Merz, “the runaway favorite to be Germany’s next leader,” has stated that “the continent must find new ways to defend itself without the U.S. military underpinning its nuclear protection through NATO”1. This represents a dramatic evolution in German security policy, which has historically relied heavily on American guarantees. Merz specifically indicated that Germany “would need to look beyond the U.S. to Britain and France for nuclear safeguards”1. While this political shift suggests a growing German willingness to invest in defense and participate more actively in European security arrangements, implementing such a dramatic change would face significant political and cultural hurdles within Germany.
France has traditionally been the most militarily autonomous major power in the European Union, maintaining independent nuclear capabilities and expressing the strongest commitment to European strategic autonomy. France’s nuclear arsenal would be a critical component of any European deterrent against Russia without American support. The apparent German interest in looking to France for nuclear safeguards suggests recognition of France’s central role in European security planning.
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The United Kingdom, while no longer an EU member following Brexit, remains a crucial European security actor with significant military capabilities and nuclear weapons. Friedrich Merz identified Britain alongside France as potential sources of nuclear safeguards for Germany in the absence of reliable American protection1. This suggests that despite Brexit, European security planning continues to incorporate the UK’s capabilities and potential contributions to continental defense.
The search results highlight some challenges in maintaining European unity on defense matters. During preparations for the March 6, 2025 special European Council meeting, “Hungary, for its part, criticized these initiatives, believing they merely fueled the escalation of the conflict with Russia”2. Additionally, the declaration on Ukraine produced at this meeting was endorsed by “only twenty-six States,” suggesting one member state (likely Hungary based on the context) declined to support it2. These divisions illustrate the challenge of developing a coherent European approach to Russia without the unifying framework provided by American leadership.
Defense Industrial Capacity and Production
Europe’s ability to confront Russia without American support would depend critically on its defense industrial base and capacity to produce and maintain advanced military equipment. The European Commission has identified serious deficiencies in European defense production resulting from decades of underinvestment, acknowledging that “the necessary rebuilding of European defence following decades of underinvestment and the indispensable ramping-up of European defence industry production capacity require an urgent increase in European defence spending”8.
A particular concern highlighted is that increased European defense spending “has only to a limited extent benefitted European manufacturers”8. This suggests that European procurement continues to flow partly to non-European suppliers, potentially including American defense companies, which would complicate efforts to build indigenous capabilities that could function independently of U.S. support.
To address these challenges, the European Commission has launched ambitious initiatives to strengthen the European defense industrial base. The ReArm Europe plan aims to mobilize “close to EUR 800 billion for a safe and resilient Europe”8, with a significant portion apparently directed toward enhancing production capabilities. More specifically, “Up to €150 billion ($163 billion) in EU-backed loans would be made available for joint procurement from the European defense industry”9, suggesting a substantial financial commitment to supporting European manufacturers.
The White Paper for European Defense emphasizes the need to “build a strong defense industrial base” and proposes ways for member states to “invest massively in defense, procure defense systems, and build up the readiness of the European defense industry in the long run”3. This indicates recognition at the European policy level of the crucial importance of industrial capacity to overall defense capabilities.
The search results also reference efforts to streamline regulatory frameworks for defense production, mentioning “the issue of legal simplification for the defense industries”2. This suggests initiatives to reduce bureaucratic obstacles to defense industrial cooperation and production, which have historically hampered European efforts to develop integrated defense manufacturing capabilities.
The Ukraine War: Strategic Lessons for European Defense
The war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year as of 2025, has provided critical insights for European defense planners considering the challenge of confronting Russia without American support. The conflict has elevated the perceived threat from Russia to unprecedented levels in recent European history, with the European Union formally recognizing Russia as a “fundamental threat” in its White Paper for European Defense3.
Support for Ukraine remains a central element of European security policy. The special European Council meeting of March 6, 2025, featured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who was “present to request reinforced support, at a time when diplomatic tensions with Washington were mounting”2. This suggests continued European commitment to supporting Ukraine even as American support potentially wavers under the Trump administration. However, the declaration on Ukraine produced at this meeting was endorsed by “only twenty-six States”2, indicating that complete European unity on this issue remains elusive.
The conflict has revealed both strengths and limitations in European defense capabilities. European countries have demonstrated the ability to provide significant military aid to Ukraine, suggesting some capacity for extended military support operations. On the other hand, the war has exposed critical capability gaps that would need to be addressed for Europe to confront Russia directly. The White Paper for European Defense aims to “present solutions to close critical capability gaps and build a strong defense industrial base”3, indicating recognition of these deficiencies.
The Ukraine conflict has also highlighted the crucial importance of defense industrial capacity. Russia’s ability to sustain its war effort despite international sanctions has been partly attributed to the expansion of its defense industry. European Commission President von der Leyen observed that “Russia has significantly augmented its military-industrial production capabilities”4, suggesting that Europe would need comparable industrial mobilization to confront Russia effectively. The ReArm Europe initiative appears designed partly to address this challenge by strengthening the Euro.
