What are the limits of Xi Jinping’s power in China?

Xi Jinping’s power in China has become a focal point of global political analysis, with many observers characterizing his rule as the most centralized since Mao Zedong. As General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), President of China, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi wields unprecedented authority over party, state, and military affairs. However, beneath this façade of monolithic control lie significant constraints that shape his decision-making and limit his capacity for unilateral action. This article examines the structural, institutional, and socio-political factors that define the boundaries of Xi Jinping’s power, offering a nuanced perspective on one of the world’s most consequential political figures.

The Institutional Architecture of Power Limitation

Constitutional and Party Mechanisms

While Xi Jinping abolished presidential term limits in 2018 through constitutional amendments3, the CCP’s collective leadership tradition continues to impose operational constraints. The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) retains theoretical authority to check excessive personalization of power, as evidenced by historical precedents where PSC members constrained Mao Zedong during the Great Leap Forward aftermath1. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), despite being weaponized by Xi in his anti-corruption campaigns, simultaneously enforces party discipline that applies to all members—including the General Secretary5.

Xi’s 2020 speech emphasizing “strengthening checks and oversight over the exercise of power” revealed an inherent tension between personal authority and institutional governance5. The party’s nomenklatura system, while manipulated by Xi to place allies in key positions4, maintains bureaucratic inertia that slows radical policy shifts. This institutional drag affects implementation timelines for initiatives like Common Prosperity and military modernization programs.

Factional Dynamics Within the CCP

The CCP’s factional ecosystem, though suppressed through Xi’s anti-corruption purges, continues to influence power dynamics. Xi’s “princeling” faction faces quiet resistance from the Communist Youth League faction and regional power blocs2. The 2025 Party Congress revealed subtle shifts in elite coalitions, with Xi balancing the interests of security apparatus loyalists against economic technocrats advocating for market reforms1.

Victor C. Shih’s analysis of Mao-era coalitions demonstrates how even loyalists like Lin Biao eventually challenged supreme leaders1. Contemporary parallels emerge in Xi’s relationship with figures like Wang Huning, whose ideological contributions remain indispensable to regime legitimacy. This creates a paradoxical dependency where Xi must continually reward key supporters with political capital while preventing their power bases from becoming rival centers of influence.

Economic Realities as a Power Constraint

Growth Imperatives and Policy Tradeoffs

China’s slowing economic growth—projected at 4.2% for 2025—forces Xi to balance ideological priorities with pragmatic economic management. The 2023 foreign investment exodus, exacerbated by national security legislation2, compelled policy corrections including renewed engagement with U.S. corporate leaders. Xi’s personal intervention to stabilize relations with the Biden administration in late 2024 illustrates how economic pressures can override ideological preferences2.

The property sector crisis and local government debt exceeding $13 trillion USD create structural constraints on fiscal policy. While Xi centralizes financial oversight through institutions like the Central Financial Commission, provincial leaders retain significant operational control over economic stabilization measures. This decentralization imperative limits Beijing’s ability to implement uniform solutions across diverse regional economies.

Technological and Demographic Challenges

China’s ambition to achieve semiconductor self-sufficiency by 2030 faces technical bottlenecks exacerbated by U.S. export controls. The 2025 chip production yield rates remain 2-3 generations behind industry leaders, forcing compromises in technological sovereignty ambitions. Concurrently, a shrinking workforce and aging population undermine long-term growth projections, creating demographic pressures that no amount of political centralization can resolve.

Foreign Policy and Geostrategic Limitations

The Security-Development Paradox

Xi’s establishment of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC) in 2013 created a dual imperative to simultaneously pursue development and security objectives2. This has resulted in policy contradictions, such as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects being scaled back due to debt sustainability concerns and geopolitical pushback. The 2024 China-Brokered Saudi Arabia-Iran Detente demonstrated Xi’s diplomatic ambition, but subsequent failures to mediate in the Myanmar civil war revealed limitations in translating economic leverage into political influence.

Alliance Dynamics and Strategic Overreach

China’s “no limits” partnership with Russia, tested by the prolonged Ukraine conflict, has constrained Xi’s options in balancing relations with Europe. The 2025 EU-China trade war over electric vehicle subsidies exemplifies how Xi’s confrontational foreign policy approach can backfire economically. Meanwhile, ASEAN nations’ hedging strategies limit China’s ability to dominate regional security architectures despite military modernization efforts.

Ideological and Social Constraints

The Legitimacy Imperative

Xi’s “Chinese Dream” narrative binds his political survival to delivering continuous improvements in living standards. The 2024 pension reform protests in Sichuan and Henan demonstrated how social stability concerns can force policy reversals. While the Great Firewall and Social Credit System enhance control, they cannot fully suppress localized dissent over issues like unemployment and healthcare access.

Historical Memory and Maoist Parallels

Xi’s cultivation of a Mao-like personality cult risks repeating historical mistakes. The disastrous consequences of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution remain potent cautionary tales within party circles1. This historical memory fuels quiet resistance to Xi’s more radical ideological campaigns, particularly among veteran party members who lived through previous political upheavals.

Military and Security Apparatus Complexities

PLA Modernization Challenges

Despite Xi’s consolidation of military command structures4, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) faces modernization hurdles. The 2025 Taiwan Strait crisis simulations revealed persistent gaps in joint operations capabilities and personnel quality. Xi’s inability to accelerate military reform without risking institutional resistance illustrates the limits of even centralized political authority over complex organizational change.

Domestic Security Tradeoffs

The People’s Armed Police (PAP) reorganization under Xi has created competing priorities between internal stability maintenance and external defense preparedness. Budget allocation disputes between the PLA and PAP highlight how security institutions can become power centers with divergent interests from central leadership.

The Paradox of Anti-Corruption Campaigns

Xi’s signature anti-corruption drive, while eliminating rivals like Zhou Yongkang2, has inadvertently created new constraints. The CCDI’s expanded powers make it a potential threat to Xi’s own allies, necessitating careful balancing of purge targets. Local implementation of anti-graft measures often deviates from central directives due to personal loyalties and guanxi networks, demonstrating the limits of top-down control in China’s vast bureaucracy.

Conclusion: The Contours of Constrained Authority

Xi Jinping’s power in China represents not absolute authority, but rather a carefully managed equilibrium between personal ambition and systemic constraints. The CCP’s survivalist ethos ultimately supersedes individual leadership, creating inherent limitations on any General Secretary’s power. As China navigates economic transitions, technological competitions, and geopolitical rivalries, Xi must continually adapt his governance model to these reality boundaries. The true test of his leadership will be recognizing these constraints not as obstacles, but as necessary parameters for sustainable regime stability in an era of unprecedented domestic and global challenges.

 

References:

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *